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Introduction 
When do states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or 
Convention) owe human rights obligations to individuals outside their territory? 
When we are talking about the extraterritoriality of the ECHR, we are trying to 
answer this question. The ECHR in Article 1 provides that states parties “shall secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of 
this Convention”. Following this wording, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR or Court) considers the question of extraterritoriality under the category of 
jurisdiction. It is now generally accepted by the Court and scholarship that the ECHR 
may – and sometimes does – apply extraterritorially, but the question of when is still 
controversial and the answer is unclear. 
In developing its jurisprudence on extraterritoriality, the ECtHR has followed 
a somewhat confusing path, frequently oscillating between various models and 
sometimes contradicting itself. Much of the relevant case law has been criticised to 
that effect.1 In any event, it is not always what one would call coherent and every new 
judgment seems to either add another layer of confusion or line of case law different 
from the rest. The recent cases of Jaloud v Netherlands2 and Pisari v Republic of 
Moldova and Russia3 concerning the jurisdiction over military checkpoints are at first 
glance no exception. However, there might be a potential for clarity if these cases are 
taken as opportunities to gain a more principled understanding of the case law on 
                                                
1 See generally M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, 
Principles, and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). 
2 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29. 
3 Pisari v Moldova and Russia (App. No. 42139/12), judgment of October 19, 2015. 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction as a whole rather than conceiving of them as yet another, 
different cluster of cases. In this light, I will argue for an interpretation that both 
marks Jaloud and Pisari as a departure from past case law and explains why the latter 
has been so confusing. 
Decided in November 2014, Jaloud has so far been discussed primarily in 
terms of its ramifications for the application of the ECHR in armed conflicts and their 
aftermath.4 Some comments mention the issue of jurisdiction but focus on specific 
problems regarding the differences between jurisdiction and attribution of conduct.5 
Now that the dust has settled, the time seems ripe to consider a few deeper 
implications of Jaloud, especially in conjunction with its confirmation in Pisari in 
October 2015. These implications are easily overlooked as the judgments are 
interesting not because of what the Court says but because of what it does not say. 
 
Facts of Jaloud and Pisari 
Jaloud concerned the death of Azhar Sabah Jaloud following a shooting at a 
checkpoint in occupied Iraq, manned by Dutch troops and members of the Iraqi Civil 
Defence Force (ICDF), on 21 April 2004. The applicant alleged that the investigation 
                                                
4 A. Sari, Jaloud v Netherlands: New Directions in Extra-Territorial Military Operations, 24 
November 2014 <http://www.ejiltalk.org/jaloud-v-netherlands-new-directions-in-extra-territorial-
military-operations/>, accessed February 16, 2016; S. Borelli, ‘Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v 
United Kingdom: Time for a Principled Approach in the Application of the ECHR to Military Action 
Abroad’ (2015) 16 Questions of International Law 25. 
5 M. Milanovic, Jurisdiction, Attribution and Responsibility in Jaloud, December 11, 2014 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/jurisdiction-attribution-and-responsibility-in-jaloud/>, accessed February 16, 
2016; A. Sari, ‘Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International Responsibility in Jaloud v. 
Netherlands: Old Problem, New Solutions?’ (2014) 53 Military Law and the Law of War Review 287. 
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into the incident was insufficient under the procedural requirement of the right life 
enshrined in article 2 of the ECHR. After an initial exchange of fire with a car, the 
Iraqi soldiers called a Dutch patrol to the checkpoint. After they arrived, another car 
hit several barrels and the Dutch troops opened fire. Azhar Sabah Jaloud was hit and 
died shortly after. All of these events took place in an area where the UK was an 
occupying power and Dutch operations were carried out under the command of an 
officer of the British armed forces. 
The ECtHR had to determine if the Dutch armed forces failed to carry out 
their obligation to investigate under Article 2 of the ECHR. Before it could do so, it 
had to ascertain whether the Netherlands had jurisdiction. It found that the 
Netherlands did, that the Convention was thus applicable, and that the shortcomings 
of the investigation indeed violated Article 2. 
Pisari is in many ways similar to Jaloud. Vadim Pisari was killed by a 
Russian soldier at a peacekeeping checkpoint in the security zone created in the 
aftermath of the Transdniestrian conflict. In the morning of 1 January 2012, Vadim 
Pisari passed the checkpoint in a borrowed car and failed to comply with an order to 
stop the vehicle. After a warning, the sergeant in command fired three shots, allegedly 
to damage the car’s tyres. Pisari was hit and died a few hours later after he had been 
hospitalized. At the time of the shooting, the checkpoint was manned by eight soldiers 
of the peacekeeping forces. Four were Russian, among them the sergeant in command 
who shot Pisari, two Moldovan and two Transdniestrian. The security zone in which 
the checkpoint was located had been created by a peace agreement and was under the 
control of a Joint Control Commission consisting of representatives of all three parties. 
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As in Jaloud, the applicants in Pisari alleged that the Russian authorities 
failed to investigate the incident pursuant to Article 2 ECHR.6 To that effect, the 
Court had to determine if Russia had jurisdiction, even though the security zone was 
not Russian territory. It held that it did and further found a violation of Article 2 of the 
Convention. 
 
Legal Principles 
Currently, the Court operates with two principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
personal and spatial, which are framed as exceptions because the assumption is still 
that jurisdiction is primarily exercised on national territory.7 The principles as they 
stand today were first outlined in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom8 and the Court quoted 
them extensively in Jaloud (but not in Pisari).9 According to the personal model, a 
state has jurisdiction when state agents exercise physical power or control over an 
individual abroad and their actions are attributable to the sending state rather than the 
territorial one.10 The paradigmatic example here is the situation of a person who is 
arrested or detained by foreign agents, be it in times of peace with the cooperation of 
                                                
6 While the original application was against both Russia and Moldova, the applicants later 
took the position that they no longer wished to pursue their application regarding Moldova. Pisari v 
Moldova and Russia (App. No. 42139/12), judgment of October 19, 2015 at [34] – [35]. 
7 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [132]; L. Garlicki, ‘New Tendencies 
on State Responsibility in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in J. Iliopoulos-
Strangas, S. Biernat and M. Potacs (eds), Responsibility, Accountability and Control of the 
Constitutional State and the European Union in Changing Times (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2014). 
8 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [133] –[139]. 
9 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29 at [139]. 
10 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [133] –[136]. 
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local agents as in Öcalan v Turkey11, or during belligerent occupation as in Hassan v 
United Kingdom12.  
The spatial principle, on the other hand, describes jurisdiction as the exercise 
of control over an area.13 In the words of the Court it 
 
occurs when, as a consequence from lawful or unlawful military action, a 
Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside [its] national 
territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms 
set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be 
exercised directly, through the Contracting State’s own armed forces, or 
through a subordinate local administration.14 
 
The paradigmatic backdrop against which the geographical model was developed is 
belligerent occupation as is the case in Al-Skeini or Loizidou v Turkey15. 
In Al-Skeini the ECtHR further specified that a state, which exercises some or 
all public powers normally to be exercised by an inviting government in accordance 
with custom or agreement, the state exercising those powers also has jurisdiction.16 It 
did so under the heading of the personal model, even though it is not entirely obvious 
that the exercise of public powers should not also be relevant in the context of the 
                                                
11 Öcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 45. 
12 Hassan v United Kingdom (App. No. 29750/09), judgment of September16, 2014. 
13 On the development of the geographical model see R. Wilde, ‘Triggering State Obligations 
Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 
503. 
14 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [138]. 
15 Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 99. 
16 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [132]. 
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spatial one. Only further on, while applying the principles to the facts, the Court 
clarified why it found this notion of public powers important. It seems the idea was to 
add a specification to the personal model that would preserve its role as a delimiting 
criterion of extraterritoriality. 17 As the ECtHR gave no further reasons let alone an 
actual justification, this is one of the more puzzling aspects of the case law. Against 
the background of the two different models and the fact that the Court keeps 
distinguishing them, this criterion seems to be neither here nor there. We will come 
back to this point below. 
Application and Interpretation 
In Jaloud, the ECtHR takes care to meticulously outline these two exceptions to the 
principle that a state’s jurisdiction is primarily exercised on its national territory.18 
The same cannot be said for their application. The Court oscillates between the 
application of the personal and the geographical model. At the outset, the ECtHR 
determines the relationship of Dutch troops with UK armed forces because the UK 
was the formal occupying power in the region.19 While an explicit reference to the 
spatial model is missing in these passages, it seems nevertheless clear that the Court 
was trying to establish that whether or not a state has control over an area does not 
                                                
17 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [149]. See also M. Milanovic, ‘Al-
Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 121, p. 130. He 
sees the notion of public powers as a limiting factor, in the absence of which the personal model would 
not be a threshold criterion at all because it would amount to endorsing the notion of jurisdiction as 
“cause and effect”. 
18 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29 at [139], citing Al-Skeini v United Kingdom 
(2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [130] –[139]. 
19 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29 at [141] – [149]. 
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depend on its status as an occupying power.20 The reason for this assertion can only 
be that the Netherlands was in fact not the occupying power in South-Eastern Iraq at 
the time but was still perceived as having jurisdiction by the ECtHR. However, when 
it comes to the actual pronouncement of jurisdiction the Court uses the phrase 
“authority and control over persons passing through a checkpoint”21, which is 
reminiscent of the personal model.22 In brief, the Court simply does not specify which 
model it applies or how the two models relate. 
Pisari is different from Jaloud in the sense that the Russian government did 
not object to the allegation that it exercised jurisdiction. 23 Accordingly, the Court 
proceeds to only outline the principles and their application very briefly. However, 
the ECtHR does not mention explicitly whether it is assessing Russia’s jurisdiction 
according to the personal or the spatial model. The Court only mentions one of the 
numerous formulations of principles it first laid down in Al-Skeini: namely, the 
exercise of “public powers”, such as judicial or executive functions, in accordance 
with treaty or custom.24 Recall that this is precisely the criterion, which the Court first 
brought up in relation with the personal model but that is not very obviously 
connected to either the personal or the spatial model of extraterritoriality. In sum, the 
Court in Pisari turns to the part of the personal model that is least clear in order to 
                                                
20 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29 at [142]. 
21 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29 at [152]. 
22 For a similar critique see F. Haijer and C. Ryngaert, ‘Reflections on Jaloud V. The 
Netherlands’ 19 Journal of International Peacekeeping 174, pp. 179-180. 
23 Pisari v Moldova and Russia (App. No. 42139/12), judgment of October 19, 2015 at [33]. 
24 Pisari v Moldova and Russia (App. No. 42139/12), judgment of October 19, 2015 at [33] 
citing Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [135] and [149]. 
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confirm Jaloud on account of the personal model even tough the latter judgment does 
not actually specify what model it was decided on. 
It seems the ECtHR in Jaloud is struggling to separate the personal model and 
the geographical one because the Dutch troops asserted authority over a very small 
and unsteady area in the form of a checkpoint but still had the power to determine 
what was happening to people who passed through it. Pisari could have removed 
doubts created by Jaloud in this respect, but did not. This calls for some clarification. 
I suggest that the switching back and forth between the two models could be read in 
two ways. Either the Court is implicitly confirming that the models are increasingly 
failing to clarify cases because they ultimately collapse into each other, or the models 
were never meaningfully separate in the first place. 
On the first reading, the ECtHR confirms a valid criticism, which consists of 
two claims. On one hand, the geographical model collapses into the personal one 
when it is applied to smaller and smaller areas or even objects.25 This is nicely 
illustrated by the factual circumstances of both Jaloud and Pisari. After all a 
checkpoint is not only (usually) too small of an area to count as a form of territory but 
it can also quite easily be moved around.26 The Court was – at least on this account – 
right not to decide either of the cases on the spatial model because it would have been 
artificial to do so. That leaves the ECtHR with the possibility to assess cases 
regarding checkpoints on the personal model, which it seemingly did in Pisari but by 
invoking the very criterion that is least obviously necessary for the personal model 
                                                
25 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), p. 171. 
26 F. Haijer and C. Ryngaert, ‘Reflections on Jaloud V. The Netherlands’ 19 Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 174, p. 181. 
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and instead bears more resemblance to the geographical one. It is at least possible that 
the Court chooses this option because it recognizes that following through on the 
personal model consistently would make jurisdiction a meaningless criterion because 
it would follow that any extraterritorial conduct that potentially violates individuals’ 
rights under the Convention constitutes jurisdiction.27 But again, the Court says 
nothing to confirm this. 
Accordingly, the interpretation of Jaloud that reveals two weaknesses of the 
personal and spatial model as well as a fundamental flaw in their relationship would 
mean that cases involving military checkpoints have turned into a “checkpoint” for 
the ECtHR itself. We could assume that the Court might be aware that the case law 
reached a point where the models it operates with can no longer clarify hard cases. 
This would explain the ECtHR’s silence on which model it was applying in Jaloud as 
well as the odd choice of criterion in Pisari. However, it also paints a bleak picture 
for the future and provides us with little perspective to make sense of this line of case 
law. 
The second reading suggests that the models were never separate to begin with. 
This would confirm the view that jurisdiction always denotes control over persons 
and that control over territory merely functions as shorthand in this context.28 In other 
words, what is relevant is control over people in a given area, not control over the 
                                                
27 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), p. 207; M. Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and 
Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in a Digital Age’ (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 81, 114-
118. See also fn. 17 above. 
28 S. Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why 
Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 857, pp. 874-876. 
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area as such. Given that human rights are claims of individuals against a state such a 
reading makes sense. It also implies that Jaloud – even in combination with Pisari – 
is actually not as confusing as it seems at first glance. Indeed, if we look at the models 
of extraterritoriality as complementing each other, a different picture emerges that 
allows us to see the checkpoint cases as a radical departure from the previous case law. 
In order to do this, however, it is necessary to take a step back to clarify two issues. 
First, the concept of power must be elaborated on. It is the common theme in both 
models and also creeps up in the ominous criterion of “public powers”. Second, to 
define what kind of power we are worried about here, we need to ask ourselves why 
we care about the application of international human rights law in the first place and 
what jurisdiction captures in this regard. 
Power as an Unobservable Concept 
In the context of Article 1 of the ECHR jurisdiction is a concept defined by factual 
power.29 This is exemplified by the Court’s definition of the personal model, the 
general, unspecified version of which reads “physical power or control” over a 
person.30 However, some form of power is clearly also relevant for the spatial model. 
The problem with power as a concept is that it is dispositional. It is, in other words, a 
                                                
29 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), ch. 2. 
30 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [136]. The ECtHR emphasizes that 
the question whether or not a state exercises effective control over an area is a question of fact; see Al-
Skeini at [139]. I read this to mean (and agree) that it is irrelevant whether any kind of power or control 
outside a state’s territory is lawful or coincides with title under international law, rather than being a 
statement on the quality or meaning of power as such. On this issue see R. Wilde, ‘Legal Black Hole – 
Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights’ (2004) 26 
Michigan Journal of International Law 739. 
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potential or capacity and as such not observable.31 This makes it unsuitable as a tool 
to delineate functions and responsibilities in legal, administrative, and military 
practice. 
The Court uses power interchangeably with control32 and thus conflates power 
with its exercise, the potential with its manifestation. Morriss and Lukes refer to this 
as the exercise-fallacy.33 It is a fallacy because power can be had without ever being 
exercised. Again, the ECtHR’s choice of words could be read in different ways. We 
could say that the Court is simply not aware of the distinction when it should be. On a 
more charitable analysis, it is possible to say the following. The Court may not be 
actively aware that this conflation is unhelpful but it is aware of the problem of power 
as a dispositional concept. That is, its reference to the exercise of power as opposed to 
power as a potential is a way of dealing with the general difficulty of power as such 
not being observable. 
This solution is only partially satisfactory, however. The most pressing 
problem here is that the conflation of power with its manifestation makes it difficult 
to distinguish between the presence of jurisdiction and the violation of a human 
                                                
31 On power as a philosophical concept see, e.g., P. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analisys, 
2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd edn 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
32 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [136]. That the Court does not 
actively distinguish between power and its exercise is also illustrated by the fact that it normally refers 
to a state as “exercising jurisdiction” rather than having it. 
33 P. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analisys, 2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002), ch. 3, in particular pp. 15-17; S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View 2nd edn (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), p. 109. 
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right.34 This in turn is problematic because jurisdiction is said to be a necessary 
condition for the ECHR to be applicable and consequently for a state to have human 
rights obligations in the first place.35 Looking at the issue this way explains why the 
Court (and some of the literature) is right to reject a “cause and effect” definition of 
jurisdiction,36 which would mean that any violation of a right proves that jurisdiction 
was present. The reason for this is not so much political expediency but the logic of 
the matter: saying that one can create obligations under the Convention by violating 
them is simply absurd. 
                                                
34 This is not the same as saying “treating the very act of shooting an individual as bringing 
them within the scope of article 1 [ECHR]” necessarily collapses the distinction between establishing 
jurisdiction and the breach of an obligation as discussed and dismissed by Leggatt J in R (Al-Saadoon) 
v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWHC 715 (Admin) at [108]-[109]. Distinguishing power as a 
potential form its exercise does, however, explain why the same set of facts (such as a shooting) should 
be considered under two sets of criteria: once as establishing jurisdiction and thus based on the right 
kind of power and once as a potential breach of an obligation where it needs to be determined whether 
an act was justified. 
35 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [130]. 
36 Banković v Belgium (App. No. 52207/99) decision of December12, 2001 at [75]; H. King, 
‘The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 521, p. 
538; M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), pp. 173-75, 208; A. Sari, Jaloud v Netherlands: New 
Directions in Extra-Territorial Military Operations, 24 November 2014 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/jaloud-v-netherlands-new-directions-in-extra-territorial-military-operations/>, 
accessed  February 16, 2016. But see Y. Shany, ‘Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional 
Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 7 The Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights 47, pp. 65-66, who endorses a form of a “cause and effect” view but can do so more 
convincingly precisely because he distinguishes power as capacity and its exercise. 
 14 
If power needs to be distinguished from its exercise in this regard, this still 
leaves us with the problem that power – correctly understood – is not observable. 
What is needed then are proxies, which allow the relevant institutions to assess who 
has the right kind of power in the situation in question. To this end, it is necessary to 
know what kind of power that would be and to then search for the right proxies. 
The Relevant Kind of Power and the Search for Proxies 
The suggestion is that Jaloud and Pisari reveal what has been the common thread in 
the case law of the ECtHR all along: identifying which state has (as opposed to 
exercises) the relevant kind of power over an area of human activity. Before looking 
at what the Court notes in this regard and how it could be read, it is helpful to take a 
step back and ask why we care about the application of international human rights law 
and what this means for the nature and function of human rights. 
Human rights as embodied in the ECHR depend on public institutions in order 
to be guaranteed but also tackle a specific worry about them: they constrain and 
channel the power of these institutions if and when the necessary institutions are 
themselves a threat to the individuals they are supposed to protect.37 In addition, the 
function of international legal human rights when they are – as is the case with the 
ECHR – judicially protected is closely connected to their legality as they depend on at 
                                                
37 For a defence of a version of such an understanding of human rights and their international 
legal dimension see G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 1. See also S. Besson, ‘The 
Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on 
Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 857. 
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least a very thin system of rules being applied.38 This reliance on public institutions 
and the rules that govern if and when they have and exercise power begins to shed 
light on the relevant kind of power that we are seeking to define here. This power, I 
suggest should be understood to reflect these two features of human rights: the 
connection with public institutions and their reliance on rules. The two criteria that 
come closest are the presence of a potential for either harm or control and the fact that 
rules are being applied to direct said potential. As we will see, this is a possible 
reading of the ECtHR’s definition as well. 
It is further useful to note why a reflection of first principles such as the 
function of the ECHR has not been as problematic in cases concerning events on 
national territory. Because human rights are so intimately connected with public 
institutions and the rules they apply they exhibit a clear focus on the state. It should 
thus not come as a surprise that the most prominent proxy for the unobservable power 
of these institutions is national territory.39 That is, instead of focusing on the nature 
and function of human rights to identify the duty-bearing state, we (and the Court) 
have been relying on territorial considerations to do this work for us. This explains 
why extraterritoriality is riddled with so much confusion. The most readily observable 
proxy is no longer available and conceptual uncertainties are brought to the fore. 
For the Court, the relevant kind of power is associated with the potential for 
physical control or harm coupled with whose rules are being applied to the right-
                                                
38 See G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 1, for a similar approach albeit with an emphasis 
on coercion rather than power as such. 
39 S. Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why 
Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 857, 863. 
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holding individuals in a way that directs said potential for control. One without the 
other is not enough. This would explain why an aerial bombing abroad does not bring 
the victims of such an attack within a state’s jurisdiction40 but a shooting at a vehicle 
checkpoint (as in Jaloud) does; even given the fact that neither of the concerned states 
controlled the relevant territory abroad. 
In the case of the airstrike (as in Banković), the potential for harm was present 
and manifested itself but the party carrying out the attack was not looking to apply 
their rules with regard to the individuals affected. The pilots may have been acting in 
accordance with the law, following rules or orders but these were not aimed at 
influencing the harmed individuals, let alone the area of human activity protected by 
the right to life. A checkpoint is different. It implies that whoever is present at the 
checkpoint does not only have the potential to exercise physical control but also 
applies their rules as the clear demand towards persons passing through to obey any 
orders given. It is telling in this respect that the Court in Jaloud took great care to 
establish that the Dutch troops exercised some command and the Netherlands 
established policies for their armed forces but neglected to differentiate between the 
models of jurisdiction.41 All of this points to the fact that the ECtHR is not actually 
utilizing its models of extraterritorial jurisdiction but is looking for observable proxies 
of what it understands to be the relevant kind of power. 
It is important to note here, that the criterion of “whose rules apply” seems to 
be rather thin in the sense that even an implicit appeal not to escape (as in the case of 
arrest or detention) or to stop a vehicle (as with the checkpoint) suffices. I am thus not 
                                                
40 Banković v Belgium (App. No. 52207/99) decision of December 12, 2001. 
41 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 29 at [142] – [149]. 
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suggesting anything as ambitious as political or even legal authority.42 The thinner 
interpretation suggested here also chimes in with the ECtHR’s specification of public 
powers as encompassing “executive or judicial functions”43 as opposed to legislative 
or other political functions. In accordance with arguments above, directing potential 
for harm with rules that are being applied to individuals should not be understood to 
require situations that trigger jurisdiction to be legal. 
To make more detailed sense of what the Court is doing when it is describing 
power and looking for proxies, Jaloud and Pisari need to be read a) in combination 
and b) as revisiting the place and role of the criterion of “public powers” that puzzled 
us in Al-Skeini. Essentially, the two cases reconceive the case law on 
extraterritoriality in general and Al-Skeini in particular in two ways. First, the spatial 
and the personal model of jurisdiction are no longer separate. Neither of the cases 
makes this distinction and, as I have argued above, rightly so.44 Second, the model 
actually applied is one that understands jurisdiction as power in the form a potential 
for harm or control and a capacity to chose and apply rules to the affected areas of 
human activity in relation to the potential victims. This means that the principle 
                                                
42 For a defence of this thicker version see S. Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction 
Amounts To’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 857, pp. 864-66. 
43 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 at [135]; Pisari v Moldova and Russia 
(App. No. 42139/12), judgment of October 19, 2015 at [33]. This is true notwithstanding the fact that 
the Court refers to “exercising” these functions and thus still commits the exercise fallacy. 
44 In this sense, Chiragov v Armenia (App. No. 13216/05), judgment of 16 June 2015 at [169] 
is a regrettable lapse back to old ways because it explicitly relies on the distinction rejected here. This 
may possibly be explained by the close resemblance with cases like Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 
E.H.R.R. 99. The actual analysis in Chiragov at [172] - [187], however, displays little regard of the 
precise formulation of the spatial model and is similar to the one in Jaloud. 
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similar to the “public powers” that was originally used by the Court to delimit the 
personal model replaces it in cases involving checkpoints. 
But could this overarching model make sense of cases ranging from shootings 
on military patrols (as in Al-Skeini) to expropriations in the aftermath of conflict and 
occupation (as in Loizidou)? I argue that it can. A combination of the a potential for 
harm and the application of rules allows us to look for very diverse proxies and is thus 
flexible but it also acts a delimiting criterion of jurisdiction. The proxy for the 
potential to cause harm consisted in the proximity of armed state agents or agents 
tasked with enforcement in some other way. This can be applied equally to very 
unstable situations like a military patrol or a checkpoint and to stable administrative 
and economic arrangements. The same goes for the application of rules. In both 
scenarios the potential for harm is not an end in itself but rather a means to an end, the 
latter of which is directed by said rules. 
Lastly, the latter part of the description of power captures exactly why we care 
about the application of Convention rights. It is not just the bad or even devastating 
outcome of a rights violation that we want to prevent. On the contrary, the relevant 
and distinguishing part of international legal human rights is that they constrain state 
power when it is directed by rules.45 This, of course, is closely associated with the 
nature of the state as a political entity embodying authority and relying on a legal 
system, which in turn explains why the Court at times seems to struggle to distinguish 
power and authority. Overall, the principle of jurisdiction described as potential for 
control and applying directing rules is more promising than either of the models the 
Court has been using so far. 
                                                
45 G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd 
edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 29-36. 
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Conclusion 
The implication of the above is that Jaloud and especially the Court’s silence on 
whether a checkpoint would be examined under the personal of the territorial model 
could become a pivotal moment for extraterritoriality. In combination with Pisari, 
Jaloud could mark the emergence of a new and potentially decisive principle that 
would replace the seemingly separate application of the personal and the geographical 
models. In turn, this could be read as a concession to the effect that the Court looks 
for proxies for what it sees as the kind of power that constitutes jurisdiction. This 
article has argued that this development should be welcomed for two reasons. First, 
the two models of jurisdiction need no longer be separated, which is bound to remove 
a lot of confusion surrounding the case law on extraterritoriality. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, the model relying on power and proxies is more successful in 
making sense of hard cases than the separate ones and in addition captures why we 
should and do care about the Convention’s application. Hopefully, this new line of 
case law means that the Court is ready to take the leap. 
